Statcast data may vindicate Yankees' controversial Trent Grisham decision

Confusion, disappointment, and finally a begrudging acceptance. Those are the emotions the majority of New York Yankees fans have experienced in the time from when the club extended Trent Grisham the qualifying offer, he accepted it, and now.

The reasons have been well-covered. It's a lot of money for a guy coming off a true outlier year, even if he is likable. More importantly, it's easy to look at Brian Cashman's claims that the club will still pursue most fans' preferred choice, Cody Bellinger, as dubious at best. After all, the competition for Bellinger's services will be fierce, and a $22 million gamble that 2025 wasn't just lightning in a bottle is a big step towards the magic $300 million limit that Cashman insists doesn't exist.

But, what if, when it comes down to Grisham versus Bellinger, that the former was actually the right choice? Sounds crazy, but the underlying data paint a picture, at least offensively, that favors the former Juan Soto trade throw-in over the 2019 NL MVP.

Statcast data shows that choosing Grisham over Bellinger is the right call for the Yankees

By now, everyone knows the numbers. Grisham's three seasons prior to 2025 featured sub-.200 batting averages and sub-.700 OPSs. That makes 2025's performance stick out like a sore thumb. But what if not much actually changed?

Grisham has always posted solid walk rates. His 14.1% clip in 2025 was a career-high, but his career mark is 12%, and he walked 13.5% of the time in his final year in San Diego when he slashed .198/.315/.352. That's a real skill that is underlined by his minuscule chase rate. Grisham posted a 17.3% chase rate in 2025, which ranked in the 99th percentile, and since 2020 has only posted a mark that wasn't 90th percentile once. That came in 2023 when his 21.6% chase rate was a still highly respectable 86th percentile performance.

Not swinging at pitches out of the zone is a good foundation, but without the skills to punish pitches in the zone, you're still not looking at much. Grisham's track record here isn't as lengthy, but he's made consistent improvements over the last three seasons that are enough to prove that he isn't just getting lucky. Let's take a look at three metrics — hard hit rate, barrel percentage, and average exit velocity, from 2023 on, to see how he fared.

In 2023, Grisham posted a 40% hard hit rate (45th percentile), an 11.9% barrel percentage (77th percentile), and a 90.3 miles per hour average exit velocity (69th percentile). In 2024, he didn't get enough plate appearances to qualify, but the metrics showed some improvement from their already solid starting point, coming in with a 46.4% hard hit rate, 12% barrel rate, and a 90.6 miles per hour average exit velocity. In 2025, he improved further, coming in at 46.4% hard hit (66th percentile), 14.2% barrels (89th percentile), and 91.1 miles per hour exit velocity (75th percentile).

So now it should be obvious that he rarely swings outside the zone, has the patience to work walks, and has improved from an already decent starting point when it comes to hitting the ball with authority, all on a consistent basis. So why then was it only in 2025 that he was an above-average offensive performer? Three metrics — launch angle sweet spot percentage (how often a ball is hit in the range of launch angles to do damage), xSLG (expected slugging percentage based primarily on exit velocity, launch angle, and batted ball type), and xwOBA (uses launch angle and exit velocity to calculate a player's expected overall production).

In 2023, he posted a launch angle sweet spot percentage of 32.8% (33rd percentile), an xSLG of .393 (29th percentile), and an xwOBA of .320 (42nd percentile). In 2024, his LA-sweet spot was 25.6%, xSLG was .386, and his xwOBA was .303. In 2025, those numbers rose to 34.6% LA-sweet spot (52nd percentile), .481 xSLG (86th percentile), and .366 wOBA (90th percentile).

One final metric to look at is his pulled-air percentage, which rose from 19.1% in 2023 to 20% in 2024, and finally to 23.5% in 2025. The MLB average is 16.7%. Balls pulled in the air typically result in the most damage being done, something especially true at Yankee Stadium.

So, Grisham has a baseline skill of elite strike zone recognition and typically only swings at pitches within the zone that he can do damage on. Over the past three seasons, he's steadily improved his ability to hit the ball hard and at angles that have optimal outcomes. Given the sample and gradual rise, it looks as if these changes are sustainable. Now we can compare that to Cody Bellinger.

Without getting too much into the weeds on Bellinger, let's accept that he and Grisham are different types of hitters. Bellinger makes more contact and strikes out less, while also walking less and chasing more. Instead, we'll look at the hard hit rates, exit velocities, barrels, xSLG, and xwOBA for Bellinger from his resurgent 2023 campaign onward.

In 2023, Bellinger posted a 31.4% hard hit rate (10th percentile), an 87.9 miles per hour average exit velo (22nd percentile, a 6.1% barrel rate (27th percentile), a .434 xSLG (58th percentile), and a .327 xwOBA (52nd percentile). In 2024, those numbers were a 32.9% hard hit rate (15th percentile), 87.8 miles per hour exit velo (23rd percentile), a 6.3% barrel rate (32nd percentile), a .390 xSLG (42nd percentile, and a .301 xwOBA (29th percentile). In 2025, he came in at a 37.9% hard hit rate (26th percentile), an 88.3 miles per hour average exit velo (24th percentile), 7.5% barrel rate (36th percentile), a .416 xSLG (51st percentile), and a .322 xwOBA (49th percentile).

Bellinger does hit the ball at prime launch angles frequently and is above average at pulling the ball in the air, but the metrics show that, despite these optimal flight paths, there isn't much oomph behind it. It's also worth noting that his 2025 xwOBA of .322 was identical to his actual wOBA in 2024 when the Cubs were desperate to dump his salary.

Through this lens, it's clear that a one-year $22 million gamble on Grisham has a much better probability of hitting than a six-year, $180 million dice roll on Bellinger. Sure, Bellinger's the speedier player and better defender, but that doesn't come close to narrowing the gap. Even for 2026's purposes alone, a $22 million AAV for Grisham gives the Yankees more wiggle room than a roughly $30 million AAV for Bellinger.

If it ultimately comes down to Grisham or Bellinger back in pinstripes, the data seems to vindicate the Yankees' decision. One would have to wonder if they could have brought him back at a slightly lower number without the QO, but at this point it doesn't make that much of a difference. Maybe this wasn't such a horrible decision, after all.